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1.  Introduction 
Increasing numbers of countries require mobile telephone network operators to offer 
mobile number portability (MNP).  This facility allows customers who wish to 
switch mobile operator to keep the mobile numbers originally assigned to them, 
avoiding the costs of switching to new numbers.   
Since MNP regulation was first mooted, policymakers have asked whether it can 
produce positive net benefits.  Ex ante evaluations of MNP carried out in several 
countries have produced detailed estimates of expected costs and direct benefits (e.g. 
the savings accruing to customers from lower switching costs).  While researchers 
have suggested MNP should have a range of potentially important effects, such as 
strengthened competition and reduced prices (see Buehler, Dewenter and Haucap 
(2006) for a recent discussion), few attempts have been made to quantify them ex 
post. 
The staggered introduction of MNP internationally provides a useful natural 
experiment.  In this paper, we use econometric analysis of international time-series 
cross-section data to estimate the average treatment effects of MNP on retail prices 
and switching by customers.  The dataset constructed for this purpose includes 
information from up to 38 countries for 22 quarters (1Q 1999 through 2Q 2004). 
We find that the quality of MNP, as proxied by the target maximum porting time, 
helps explain its impact on switching and average prices.  For countries in our 
sample that required porting to be completed in five or fewer days, MNP was 
associated with increased customer switching and lower prices.  The sub-sample of 
countries with less stringent porting time standards experienced no significant churn 
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The costs associated with the MNP service depend upon the technology used to 
deliver it (Buehler, Dewenter and Haucap, 2006).  The technology, in turn, 
determines the “quality” of MNP, including dimensions such as porting time and 
reliability.  Previous research, e.g. Gans, King and Woodbridge (2001), has 
emphasised the importance that the choice of number portability technology has in 
determining the likely effects of the measure.  Our results provide empirical support 
for this view.  Jurisdictions conducting ex ante assessments of MNP in the future 
should consider the likely trade-off between achieving positive market outcomes and 
cost of implementation. 
Section 2 of the paper provides a brief classification of the potential benefits of MNP 
and refers to some previous research, including both ex ante cost-benefit studies and 
other empirical research.  In Section 3, we ask what effects MNP should be expected 
to have on consumer switching behaviour and prices.  The dataset constructed for 
this study is described in Section 4, along with some descriptive statistics.  Sections 5 
and 6 set out econometric models of switching and retail prices, respectively, and 
Section 7 discusses our conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
2.  Potential Benefits of Mobile Number Portability 
To provide context for the empirical analysis that follows, in this section we briefly 
review some relevant empirical research.  This consists of ex ante cost benefit 
analyses conducted on MNP by regulators and a modest number of ex post empirical 
studies.  Existing theoretical research on mobile number portability was recently 
surveyed in Buehler and Haucap (2004), but to clarify terminology used in the 
remainder of the section, it is worth restating the standard classification of number 
portability benefits. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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2.1  Classification of benefits 
 A commonly-used approach to analysing the likely costs and benefits of MNP 
divides the measure’s potential benefits into three types:
1 Type 1 benefits obtained 
directly by customers who switch, Type 2 benefits obtained by all mobile telephony 
customers (e.g. efficiency gains and price reductions due to strengthening of 
competition) and Type 3 benefits obtained by those making calls to ported numbers. 
Past ex ante evaluations have proceeded on the basis that MNP should be expected to 
provide net welfare gains if the sum of these benefits exceeds the cost of network 
investments, process changes and operating expenses incurred to make mobile 
numbers portable.  However, they have tended to focus on the more empirically 
tractable Type 1 and Type 3 benefits, giving less emphasis to Type 2 benefits.  In 
Section 2.2 we review some of the results of these ex ante evaluations.   
2.2  Ex-ante Cost-benefit Analyses 
Full mobile number portability (MNP) was first employed in Singapore in 1997, and 
since then many countries have introduced this form of regulation.  Several cost-
benefit analyses (CBAs) are available in published form, notably Oftel (1997) for the 
UK, NERA/Smith (1998) for Hong Kong, and Ovum (2000) for Ireland.  In Table 1 
below, we summarise the estimated benefits per customer by type from each of these 
studies. 
                                                 
1  This  framework  was  originally  devised  by  NERA  for  the  UK  regulator  OFTEL  in  a  study  of 
geographical number portability: Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1995), pp.58-59.  See Oftel 
(1997) for an early application to mobile number portability. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
    5 
Table 1: Predictions from three ex ante assessments of MNP 
Country  UK  Hong Kong  Ireland 
Base year  1997  1998  2000 
Expected benefits per subscriber 
Present value (in USD) of ten year impact divided by subscribers in base year 
Type 1   28 - 81  39 - 71  78 
Type 2  n/a  1  26 
Type 3  1 - 5  1 - 3  5 
       
Sources: analysis of estimates in Oftel (1997), NERA/Smith (1998) and Ovum (2000).  Exchange rates are base 
year figures from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
Type 2 benefits were viewed as difficult to estimate, and since Type 1 benefits were 
by themselves expected to be sufficiently high to justify the intervention, Type 2 
benefits were either not quantified or subject to only simple scenario analysis.  For 
example, in the CBA for the Irish market, Ovum assumed that MNP would lead to a 
3% fall in retail post-pay mobile telephony prices.
2  Sensitivity analysis was carried 
out for reductions of 1% and 5%.  Ovum also noted that there might be benefits from 
cost efficiencies or greater innovation, but these were not modelled. 
2.3  Other empirical research on the effects of MNP 
The main ex post empirical work on MNP to date has focused on the propensity of 
those switching mobile provider to use MNP.  This is particularly relevant to the size 
of Type 1 benefits as discussed above. 
As part of a wider study of switching costs for the UK Office of Fair Trading, NERA 
(2003) examined the usage of MNP for inter-operator switching in UK mobile 
telephony markets.  They found that in the first two years after MNP was introduced, 
the usage of MNP was very limited for residential customers, with only 12% of 
customers that switched operator taking up the portability option.  This is far lower 
than the rate predicted in ex ante assessments.  However, half of businesses who Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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changed numbers in this period ported at least some of their numbers.  NERA 
suggested that the difficulty of using MNP during the first years after implementation 
may explain its unpopularity: porting a number originally took an average of 25 
days.  When the delivery time was reduced to five days on average, take-up 
increased to about 18% for residential customers and 80% for businesses.
3 
Looking beyond the propensity of switchers to use MNP, there has been little 
previous empirical work on the broader effects of MNP regulation.  Ovum (2005) 
examined the experience of MNP in six countries that have implemented it: 
Australia, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK.  Several of 
their findings are relevant to this study: 
·  Usage of MNP can fall significantly if the time it takes to change operator 
(“porting time”) is too long.  The authors suggest that two days is a practical 
upper limit.  However, very short porting times do not necessarily increase 
demand for MNP. 
·  High end-user charges for MNP can also deter usage of the facility.  Lower 
charges, which the authors suggest are levels of less than 20% of monthly 
average revenue per user, do not seem to be a “major deterrent to usage”.
4  
However, zero charges do not seem to increase demand beyond the levels 
associated with low charges. 
·  In jurisdictions with MNP, the extent to which switching customers use it 
varies widely and tends to increase over time.   
                                                                                                                                          
2 Ovum (2000), pp.12-13. 
3 NERA (2003), pp.37-39. 
4 Ovum (2005), p.1. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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There has also been a limited amount of academic research on individual markets.  
Below we cite two concerning MNP and one on number portability in a related 
market. 
Lee, Kim and Park (2004) used contingent valuation techniques to estimate the 
prospective demand for MNP in South Korea.  They found that the average South 
Korean mobile user was willing to pay an average of 3.24% of his or her monthly bill 
for a mobile number portability option.  Willingness to pay (WTP) showed a strong 
positive association with income, awareness of MNP, and intention to switch.  The 
authors also found that WTP varied significantly depending upon a user’s network 
operator: the figure was lower for customers of the incumbent operator than those 
using either of the alternative operators.  Other demographic variables such as age, 
gender and occupation were not found to be significant. 
A recent ex post study of MNP’s effects also focuses on South Korea.  Kim (2005) 
estimated switching costs for customers of two of the country’s mobile network 
operators by applying a random utility model to cross-sectional subscriber-level 
microdata.  The paper compared switching costs calculated using samples before and 
after MNP, and differences between these estimates were attributed to MNP.  
Controls included firm-specific dummy variables, prices, non-price network 
attributes and customer characteristics.  The paper estimated that MNP reduced 
average switching costs in South Korea by more than 35%.
5  Data reported in the 
paper indicates that there was significantly more switching after MNP was 
introduced, at least among customers of the largest operators.
6  Service fees 
maintained a downward trend of about 7% per annum from 2002-2005, with no 
                                                 
5 Kim (2005), p.16. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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obvious change in relative or absolute prices at the point MNP was introduced for the 
two largest operators (July 2003).
7  Per-minute prices remained broadly unchanged 
over the period.
8 
Viard (forthcoming) examined the effect of number portability on prices in the US 
market for toll-free calls.  This service is different from mobile telephony, but it is 
similar in some respects (e.g. high rates of growth).
9  Estimating price regressions on 
data from 219 AT&T virtual private network contracts, he found that introduction of 
number portability was associated with price reductions of 4.4%.  A control group of 
contracts containing no toll-free services showed no relationship between prices and 
the introduction of number portability.  Viard interpreted the results as evidence of 
an inverse relationship between switching costs and competition in this market: 
“despite rapid growth in the market, the firms’ incentive to exploit their existing 
‘locked in’ users was greater than their incentive to ‘lock in’ new customers.”
10 
3.  Likely effects of MNP on switching and prices 
In this section, we outline the main effects that economic theory suggests MNP 
should have on switching propensity and retail prices. 
                                                                                                                                          
6 Ibid, Table 2. 
7 Ibid, p.11. 
8 Ibid, Figure 5. 
9 Note, however, that there are also important differences between mobile telephony and toll-free calls 
markets; in particular, mobile operators may be able to price discriminate between new and existing 
users.  NERA (2003) noted that handset subsidies in effect involve lower prices for new customers 
than for existing ones; pp.30-31. 
10 Viard (2004), p.25. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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3.1  MNP and consumer switching 
Significant numbers of customers switch operators at some point after their initial 
acquisition of a mobile subscription.  There are likely to be many reasons for such 
switching, e.g. changes in individual demand patterns, service innovation, learning 
by customers about the fit between their pattern of demand and operator offerings, 
and changing price and quality propositions. 
To the extent that the component of switching cost associated with changing one’s 
telephone number is high enough to deter some customers from switching operator 
when they might otherwise have done so, MNP should yield a positive change in the 
conditional probability of switching (holding other variables constant).  This effect 
might be offset in whole or in part by operators’ reactions, e.g. if operators respond 
to MNP by reducing price dispersion.  Nevertheless, MNP should have at least a 
weakly positive effect on switching.  
3.2  MNP and retail prices 
The net effect of MNP on retail prices is in principle indeterminate.  Empirically, it is 
likely to depend upon the interplay of three groups of effects: 
·  Pass-through of costs associated with the facility (increase in prices); 
·  Effects on competition (probably a decrease in prices); and 
·  Loss of customer information (increase in prices). 
First, and most obviously, the implementation of MNP imposes costs on all operators 
employing it.  Depending upon the extent of competition in a given national market, 
these costs are likely to be (at least partly) passed on to consumers and thereby lead 
to increased prices.  Some argue that this is likely to be the main effect of number 
portability, and hence that mandating it through regulation will lead to a net Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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reduction in welfare; see, for example, Ellig (2005).
11  Aoki and Small (1999) also 
address the welfare impact of switching cost reductions due to number portability.  
They identify cases in which switching costs reductions provided by number 
portability (e.g. reducing the need to purchase complementary goods such as 
stationery) could be offset by higher marginal costs of providing call services, 
leaving consumers with lower surplus. 
Beyond the simple effect of increased direct costs from implementation of MNP, 
theory is less definite about the effect of decreased switching costs on prices.  A 
survey by Klemperer (1995) on the effects of consumer switching costs on 
competition concludes that “switching costs generally raise prices and create 
deadweight losses of the usual kind in a closed oligopoly.”
12  Buehler and Haucap 
(2004) present a model focussing specifically on MNP that yields an overall 
reduction in prices for customers but implies that increases for entrants’ customers 
will be more than offset by decreases for incumbents’ customers.  The switching cost 
literature also raises the possibility that a fall in switching costs could make it easier 
to sustain tacit collusion , e.g. Padilla (1995). 
The third group of effects concerns an informational channel through which MNP 
may lead to increases in at least one component of mobile telephony prices.  
Depending upon how MNP is implemented, it may reduce the tariff information 
available to both fixed and mobile customers wishing to make calls to mobile 
numbers.  This effect is discussed in Buehler and Haucap (2004) and Gans and King 
(2000).  Particularly if mobile termination rates are unregulated and there is no 
                                                 
11 Ellig (2005), p.29. 
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mechanism identifying the terminating operator to each caller, such a decrease in 
transparency could lead to higher prices for call termination. 
4.  Data employed 
We have constructed an unbalanced time-series cross-section dataset that includes 
most of the OECD and a selection of developing countries.  It is based principally on 
the Merrill Lynch Global Wireless Matrix (Merrill Lynch, 2004).   
Although this source provides some data on 46 countries, there are many gaps.  Also, 
we found that data for three countries, China, the Czech Republic and South Korea, 
contained implausibly large fluctuations in reported subscriber numbers.  As a result, 
these countries were excluded from the dataset.  The available panel includes data on 
38 countries (for churn modelling) and 37 countries (for price modelling).  See Table 
10 in the annex for details of the countries and the sample coverage. 
The data are quarterly, running for up to 22 quarters from 1Q 1999 through 2Q 2004, 
and we omit the first two quarters to allow use of differenced and lagged variables.  
Table 2 below lists the variables and provides summary statistics.  Figures in this 
table and elsewhere in the paper are rounded to three significant digits. Further 
information on some of the variables is provided in the annex.   
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Table 2: Variable descriptions, sources and summary statistics (individual 
observations are for country i and quarter t in each case) 
  Churn model  Price model 
Variable  Description  Source  Mean  St Dev  Mean  St Dev 
MNPit 
= 1 if mobile number 
portability in place at 
any time in quarter t 
See 
Table 10 in 
the annex 
0.285  0.452  0.240  0.428 
MNPtimeit 
Target maximum 
single line porting 
period (days) 
Ibid.  1.81  4.18  1.69  4.22 
MNP5dit 
If MNP = 1 and 
MNPtime <=5 then 1, 
else 0 
Ibid.  0.175  0.381  0.128  0.334 
MNP6pit 
If MNP = 1 and 
MNPtime >5 then 1, 
else 0 
Ibid.  0.109  0.312  0.112  0.316 
RMNPit  If MNP = 1, then 
(1/MNPTime), else 0  Ibid.  0.390  1.94  0.382  1.96 
CHURNit 
Monthly number of 
disconnections from a 
network expressed as 
% of MNO’s avg. 
subscriber base in the 
same month.  Quarterly 





0.0205  0.0102     
DENit 
Cellular density: 
mobile users as a share 
of population 
Analysis of 
ML  0.534  0.298     
OPSit  Number of MNOs in 
country i 
Analysis of 
ML  3.76  1.23  3.72  1.21 
RGDPPCit  Real GDP per capita 
(US$) 
See 
the annex  17,400  12,300  17,100  12,100 
RPMit 
Average real revenue 
per minute for MNOs 






    0.198  0.0794 
TOTMINit 
Monthly average 
minutes of mobile 
telephony traffic in 
country i (millions) 
Analysis of 
ML      3,710  10,000 




WDI (2004)      126  144 
HHIit 
Herfindahl Hirshman 
Index: Sum of the 
squares of the market 
shares (users) of all 
MNOs in country i 
Analysis of 
ML      3,790  976 
CR1it  The top MNO’s share 
of total users 
Analysis of 
ML      0.477  0.116 
Notes: MNO is an abbreviation for “mobile network operator”.  Merrill Lynch (2004) is referred to as ML. 
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5.  Modelling the effect of MNP on switching 
In this section, we define and estimate two econometric models of switching 
frequency, including proxy variables to capture the effect of MNP. 
The switching variable 
The ideal measure of switching for our purposes would directly identify flows of 
customers between operators, but such data are generally not put in the public 
domain.  The best available proxy is churn, a metric based on the number of 
disconnections from each network as a proportion of the average number of network 
users in a given period.  While inter-operator switching does feed into churn, the 
churn rate is not a pure measure of switching.  Subscribers that leave a network 
without joining another one, for whatever reason, also appear as churn, as do 
customers on pre-paid tariff packages that do not use their phones for a specified 
period. 
Because churn is a proportion, we apply a logistic transformation to the data before 















ln             (2) 
Explanatory variables 
Switching propensity should be positively related to the presence or absence of MNP 
and to the quality of the MNP service, insofar as the service reduces consumer 
switching costs.  However, we have no theoretical prior as to the functional form of 
                                                                                                                                          
13 This is rebased to year 2000 prices using GDP deflators and it excludes revenue from data services. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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the relationship.  To allow for a range of possibilities, we test two alternative proxies 
for MNP, both based on the target maximum porting time (MNPTM) in force in a 
given country.
14 
The first is a threshold approach, distinguishing between countries with a MNPTM of 
5 days or less (for which MNP5D is set to 1) and those with 6 days or more (for 
which MNP6P is set to 1).  Both variables are set to zero for all other cases.  This 
divides the observations where MNP was in place into two roughly equal parts along 
the quality dimension.  The second MNP proxy, MNPR is equal to the reciprocal of 
MNPTM for observations with MNP and to zero for those without the service. 
In the remainder of this section, we include some descriptive statistics to illustrate 
the key bi-variate relationships in our data.   
A comparison of averages suggests that countries with “high quality” MNP had 
slightly higher churn than those without MNP, but those with “low quality” MNP 
had slightly lower churn (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Relationship between churn rates and mobile number portability 
Case  Sample mean quarterly churn 
No MNP  0.0203 
MNP delivery time <= 5 days  0.0218 
MNP delivery time 6+ days  0.0198 
Source: see Table 2 above. 
 
In a regression analysis, we expect coefficients on both MNP5D and MNP6P to be 
positive, but the former should be larger than the latter to the extent that MNP quality 
is important to consumers.  MNPR is also expected to have a positive coefficient, but 
                                                 
14 Data on actual, rather than target, porting times would probably be a better measure of quality.  
Unfortunately, these data are not made public in most countries. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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its success in explaining churn will depend upon how well its specific function form 
fits the data. 
We also note that the decision to enact MNP regulation may be affected by market 
conditions, including churn levels.  The econometric model will need to take this 
possible endogeneity into account. 
The number of operators, Ops, should have a positive coefficient reflecting increased 
switching options and promotional activity as the number of operators rises. 
A proxy for real incomes, RGDPPC, is included to a capture possible reduction in 
disconnections as income rises.  This is expected to have a negative coefficient, 
because we expect that, in line with previous research, customers’ demand for 
mobile network access is positively related to income.  If this is the case, it also 
seems likely that users with higher income are ceteris paribus less likely to stop 
using mobile telephony once they have started than those of lower income.  Since the 
churn figures include those who disconnect from one network without connecting to 
another, it is likely to be lower in markets with higher average incomes. 
Finally, we include cellular density terms, which measure the number of mobile 
connections per head of population (DEN).  This is intended to allow for a possible 
relationship between market maturity and churn.  We might expect an increase in 
switching propensity as customers become more familiar with mobile telephony and 
as cohorts with greater price sensitivity take up access.  In more mature markets, 
falling demand growth may weaken the incentives for switching by changing the 
nature of competition (for example, via reductions in handset subsidies).  Since 
density tends to approach a limit as each market matures rather than continuing to Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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rise linearly, we include higher order transformations of this variable in the 
regressions.
15   
Quarterly dummies (Q1 and Q3-Q4) are also included.  Other factors that could 
affect churn, but on which data are not available, include the rate of service 
innovation, the extent of pre-paid customer registration vs. anonymity, the frequency 
of customer repeat purchase or sampling, contract lengths, the level of other (non-
number-related) switching costs and the extent of substitutability between services of 
different operators. 
We allow for I.I.D. errors in the measurement of variables through a disturbance 
term (εit).  It also seems likely that data limitations, particularly regarding local 
preferences and service characteristics, have led to omission of variables that might 
help explain the level of churn in each country, so we expect to observe significant 
individual effects at country level (ui). 
Hence, for country i = 1...38 and quarter t = 1…20: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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Summary of prior expectations about coefficients:  
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5.1  Econometric Results 
Since diagnostic tests after fixed effects OLS estimation showed evidence of 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity,
16 we estimated the models using the Arellano-
Bond “difference GMM” estimator with robust standard errors.  T-statistics are 
reported rather than Z-statistics due to the relatively small sample.  The results are 
shown in Table 4 below. 
Table 4: Churn regression results using Arellano-Bond estimator, with MNP 
variables treated as endogenous 
Variables and 
statistics 
Using MNP delivery time 
threshold dummies 
(<=5 days, >6 days) 
Using reciprocal of MNP delivery 
time for countries with MNP 
Dep. variable  LGTCHURNit  LGTCHURNit 
  Coef.  Robust t-stat.  Coef.  Robust t-stat. 
LGTCHURNi(t-1)  0.682  12.12***  0.675  12.03*** 
MNP5dit  0.166  2.09**     
MNP6pit  -0.171  -1.63     
RMNPit      0.00752  1.49 
OPSit  -0.00719  -0.17  -0.0117  -0.27 
LRGDPPCit  -0.171  -1.75*  -0.164  -1.57 
DENi(t-1)  1.22  1.5  1.31  1.95* 
DENi(t-1)
2  -2.13  -1.65*  -2.14  -2.27** 
DENi(t-1)
3  1.43  1.9  1.39  2.64*** 
Constant  -0.00646  -0.98  -0.00623  -1.02 
Q1it  0.0227  1.49  0.0230  1.46 
Q3it  0.0210  1.17  0.0229  1.27 
Q4it  0.0409  2.49**  0.0420  2.54** 
Sample  38 countries  38 countries 
Observations  667  667 
Min. periods  7  7 
Avg. periods  17.6  17.6 
Max. periods  20  20 
F(12,654)  35.9   
F(11,655)    32.4 
Arellano-Bond residual 
serial correlation test, 
order 2 
Z = 0.04 [0.972]  Z = 0.03 [0.978] 
Note: All variables are in first differences apart from the constant, and variables with an L prefix are 
in log terms.  Figures in italics are t-statistics; *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively.  Numbers in brackets are p-values.  Data sources: see Table 2 above. 
 
                                                 
16 Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity: c
2(38)=10,300 [0.000]; Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data: F(1,37) = 17.3 [0.0002] Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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The one-period lag of our transformed churn variable is highly significant, positive 
and less than one, showing substantial persistence in the churn process.  We find no 
evidence of second order autocorrelation in the residuals.
17   
There is a significant difference between the churn dummies for countries with a five 
day or shorter maximum target porting time and those permitting a longer porting 
time.
18  Countries requiring faster porting times experienced significantly higher 
churn rates after MNP, whereas there was no significant effect for those with a 
slower standard.   Our alternative MNP variable based on the reciprocal of the target 
maximum porting time seems to have little explanatory power. 
It is difficult to directly interpret the levels of coefficients in a model where the 
dependent variable has undergone a logistic transformation.  However, in Table 5 
below, we provide simulation results for the average treatment effect of MNP on 
quarterly churn rates and the equivalent increase in the average level of churn for 
countries with porting times of 5 days or less. 
Table 5: Estimated MNP average treatment effect on churn and equivalent 
change in quarterly churn rates for countries with <=5 day porting rate target 
Measure  Short run  Long run 
Average treatment effect
19  0.253%  0.714% 
Implied percentage change compared to sample 
average churn rate (2.05% as per Table 2) 
+13.6%  +34.7% 
 
The short run predicted increase in churn seems consistent with predictions in ex ante 
studies.  For example, in a CBA conducted for Hong Kong, scenarios were examined 
                                                 
17 Second order autocorrelation would have been indicative of inconsistency, as per Arellano and 
Bond (2001), pp.281-282. 
18 A Wald test rejected equality between the MNP coefficients: F(1,654) = 6.88 [0.0098] 
19 The treatment effects are evaluated with other variables set to their sample averages.  For the long 
run effect, the current period and lagged churn rates converged at 1.77% with MNP, in comparison to 
1.06% without MNP. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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allowing for increases of 5-15% in the churn rate following introduction of MNP.
20  
Our estimate is slightly lower than the 15% increase in actual switching (as opposed 
to churn) after MNP reported for South Korea in Kim (2005),
21 but we should expect 
this given that not all churn involves an inter-operator switch.  However, note that 
because of the strong persistence we find in churn rates, the model predicts that the 
long run impact of MNP on churn will be significantly higher. 
Other results from the models are broadly as expected.  Two of the quarterly 
dummies are not significant, but the Q4 dummy provides evidence of higher churn in 
the fourth quarter.  This may reflect seasonal marketing activity or shifts in demand.  
The number of operators and the constant term were also found to be insignificant. 
All other coefficients in the two models have the expected signs, although income is 
of only marginal significance.  While the cellular density terms in the first model 
appear to be individually insignificant, this is probably due to multicollinearity; a 
joint test on them rejects a zero value.
22   
We also tested lags of the MNP variables from 1-4 quarters, but the highest 
significance level was achieved with no lag. 
6.  Modelling the effect of MNP on prices 
The cross-country data available for estimating the effect of MNP on retail prices 
limits us to a relatively simple modelling strategy.  In particular, it is not possible to 
maintain the standard access/usage distinction and other more complex features of 
                                                 
20 NERA/Smith (1998), p.66. 
21 Non-switching status fell from 91% to 79.1% of those surveyed; Kim (2005), Table 2. 
22 F(3,654) = 2.85 [0.0366] Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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telephony demand models.  Again we employ two models using different proxies for 
quality-adjusted MNP.  These models are described below. 
The price variable 
The proxy for prices is quarterly real average revenue per minute (RPM).  It is an 
aggregate measure encompassing all revenues associated with mobile voice services 
in each country (but excluding revenue from data services). 
Use of an average revenue proxy for prices involves a departure from the approach 
used by most other analyses of regulatory impact on prices in the mobile sector.
23  
Prices are more commonly measured for a specified service bundle (e.g. three 
minutes of calling time). 
RPM has some advantages as a price proxy.  For example, we have already noted 
that charges for service components such as handsets and call termination may be 
affected by MNP, and these might not be captured if we were to focus on some other 
measure, such as the average price of a three minute call or the price of a bundle of X 
minutes. 
However, the benefits of aggregation come at a price.  In particular, previous 
research into telephony demand has highlighted differences in the determinants of 
demand for network access and network usage (i.e. calls).  RPM aggregates these 
differences away.  Other potentially important features of telephony pricing are also 
obscured by averaging, including handset subsidies, time of day effects, innovation 
in tariff structures (e.g. bundling schemes and pre-payment offerings) and the mix of 
different call types (e.g. national vs. international).   
                                                 
23 However, the same approach was taken in Hazlett and Muñoz (2004) for their study of the impact 
of spectrum licensing policies. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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Explanatory variables 
We use the same two alternative sets of regulatory variables as in the analysis of 
churn described above.  The first model includes dummy variables based on target 
maximum porting times: one where MNPTM was 5 days or less (MNP5D) and one 
where it was 6 days or longer (MNP6P).  The second model uses the reciprocal of 
MNPTM.  
Table 6 below shows how the average of RPM, our proxy for price of mobile 
services, varies in the sub-samples with and without MNP.  These statistics paint a 
surprising picture, inasmuch as MNP appears to increase prices.   
Table 6: Relationship between average prices (real revenue per minute) and 
mobile number portability 
Case  Sample mean real revenue per minute 
(USD) 
No MNP  0.192 
MNP delivery time <= 5 days  0.206 
MNP delivery time 6+ days  0.233 
Source: see Table 2 above. 
 
However, these descriptive statistics may be misleading.  First, there is a declining 
trend in consumer prices across all countries during the period, and where MNP was 
implemented it tended to come later in the time series.  This timing effect will tend to 
bias the MNP averages downward.  A similar downward bias may arise because 
there is a positive association of MNP with quantity of call minutes sold and a 
negative relationship between quantity and price.  In contrast, GDP is positively 
associated with both MNP and prices, which could lead to an upward bias in the 
average.  To isolate the effects of MNP from other variables, we turn to regression 
analysis. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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Unlike the MNP coefficients in the churn models, the coefficients on MNP variables 
in the price models are expected to be negative, reflecting stronger competition in 
markets with lower switching costs.  We again treat them as potentially endogenous. 
Since each price observation in our dataset is associated with a unique Q (unlike the 
studies cited above, which fixed Q), we must control for the total quantity of minutes 
actually delivered by operators in a given country at price RPM.  This quantity 
variable is designated TOTMIN, and it too is taken to be endogenous to allow for the 
simultaneous determination of quantities and prices in mobile markets. 
We have a choice of proxies for the effects of market concentration on pricing, 
including the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), the one-firm concentration ratio 
(CR1) and the number of network operators (OPS).  These are tested alternately in 
the regression since we do not wish to prejudge the nature of competition in the 
market.  If greater concentration implies weaker competition in mobile telephony 
markets, HHI and CR1 should have positive coefficients when each of them is 
included, and OPS should have a negative one. 
Population density (PDNST), a proxy for local cost conditions, should have a 
negative coefficient reflecting economies of density.  Real GDP per capita 
(RGDPPC), a proxy for income, might take a positive coefficient as per the 
reasoning in Shew (1994) that customers in high income areas will exhibit less price 
sensitivity, leading to higher prices in such areas.
24  Both of these variables might 
have a non-linear relationship to average prices, so higher order terms are included in 
the regression. 
                                                 
24 Shew (1994), p.55. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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We also include a time trend (TIME) to allow for time-varying unobserved effects 
and quarterly dummies to capture seasonal variations in pricing policies and demand 
patterns. 
Detailed information on service characteristics is not readily available on an 
internationally-comparable basis.  However, since we have time-series cross-section 
data, characteristics that are jurisdiction-specific may be captured by the use of 
individual effects. 
Other potentially relevant variables were unavailable for the relevant set of countries 
and periods, including details of marginal price schedules, prices of substitutes (e.g. 
fixed line services), differences in contract terms, quantities of spectrum allocated in 
each country, the extent of trans-national ownership or control of operators, 
availability and relative importance of pre-paid services, advertising expenditure, and 
regulatory variables other than MNP (e.g. requirements to offer wholesale roaming 
or access to service providers).   
As in the churn model discussed earlier, we include a disturbance term (εit) and 
control for individual effects at country level (ui).  Logs are taken of continuous 
variables, including RPM. 
To summarise, for country i = 1...37 and quarter t = 1…20: 
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6.1  Econometric Results 
In this section, we estimate the model described in Section 6 above.  Table 7 below 
sets out the regression results.  As we found when modelling churn, initial estimation 
using OLS with fixed effects gave rise to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
25  
Here too, we estimated the models shown below using the Arellano-Bond estimator 
with robust standard errors, and diagnostic testing rejects the presence of second 
order serial correlation in the residuals.  Due to differencing of the data, the fixed 
effects are eliminated and the differenced time trend yields a constant. 
 
                                                 
25 Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity: c
2(38)=12,800 [0.000]; Wooldridge test of 
autocorrelation in panel data: F(1,36) = 27.8 [0.000] Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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Table 7: Price regression results using Arellano-Bond estimator, with 
LTOTMIN and MNP variables treated as endogenous 
Variables and 
statistics 
Using MNP delivery time 
threshold dummies 
(<=5 days, >6 days) 
Using reciprocal of MNP delivery 
time for countries with MNP 
Dep. variable  LRPMit  LRPMit 
  Coef.  Robust t-stat.  Coef.  Robust t-stat. 
LRPMi(t-1)  0.453  4.92***  0.458  4.83*** 
MNP5di(t-1)  -0.0658  -3.18***     
MNP6p i(t-1)  -0.0258  -0.94     
RMNPi(t-1)      -0.00676  -3.41*** 
LTOTMINit  -0.343  -5.46***  -0.332  -5.35*** 
LPDNSTit  -1.30  -0.25  -1.32  -0.27 
LPDNST
2
it  1.08  0.77  1.10  0.82 
LPDNST
3
it  -0.133  -1.15  -0.132  -1.17 
LRGDPPCit  1.20  2.37**  1.22  2.52** 
LRGDPPC
2
it  -0.0306  -1.29  -0.0330  -1.45 
LHHIit  -0.158  -1.35  -0.169  -1.34 
Constant  0.00231  0.9  0.000556  0.23 
Q1it  -0.0250  -3.28***  -0.0263  -3.45*** 
Q3it  0.0115  1.5  0.0113  1.49 
Q4it  0.00344  0.53  0.00305  0.47 
Sample  37 countries  37 countries 
Observations  649  649 
Min. periods  4  4 
Avg. periods  17.5  17.5 
Max. periods  20  20 
F(14,634)  974   
F(13,635)    1,290 
Arellano-Bond residual 
serial correlation test, 
order 2 
Z = -0.90 [0.366]  Z = -1.02 [0.307] 
Note: All variables are in first differences apart from the constant, and variables with an L prefix are 
in log terms.  Figures in italics are t-statistics; *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively.  Numbers in brackets are p-values.  Data sources: see Table 2 above. 
 
We found evidence that MNP reduces retail prices, but only when its quality is high.  
For those countries with MNP delivery times of five days or less, the estimated short 
run effect of implementing MNP was a fall in real average prices of about 6.6%, after 
a one quarter lag.
26  The estimated long run reduction was significantly higher, at 
12%.  We also found a negative MNP coefficient for countries with longer MNP 
delivery times, but it was not significantly different from zero.  However, these Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
    26 
results do not prove that a tighter MNP standard yielded a stronger price effect; we 
could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the two MNP dummies were 
equal (F(1,634) = 2.70 [0.101]). 
The alternative approach of including the reciprocal of each country’s maximum 
time for MNP delivery also yielded a negative coefficient.  This model implies a 
substantial price effect in countries with the tightest MNP delivery standards, but 
little effect elsewhere (see Table 8 below). 
Table 8: Estimated effect of MNP on real average 
retail prices from 1/MNPTime model 
MNP standard  Short run  Long run 
2 hours  -8.11%  -14.97% 
2 days  -0.34%  -0.62% 
5 days  -0.14%  -0.25% 
10 days  -0.07%  -0.12% 
20 days  -0.03%  -0.06% 
 
As expected, we found a robust inverse relationship between the number of minutes 
of traffic and real average prices.  Income and population density variables also had 
the expected signs.  Although t-tests on each of the population density terms 
suggested a lack of statistical significance, a joint test on all the terms strongly 
rejected a zero value: F(3,634) = 3.59 [0.0135] 
Neither HHI (shown above) nor alternative proxies for market concentration (CR1 
and OPS) proved to be significant.  We did find evidence of lower average prices in 
the first quarter of each year, perhaps reflecting the effect of temporary discounts on 
packages sold in the fourth quarter, but the constant term is not significantly different 
from zero. 
                                                                                                                                          
26 We tested lags of between 0 and 4 quarters on the MNP variables, and the signs were the same in all 
cases, although statistical significance varied.  A one quarter lag yielded the highest t-statistic for 
MNP5d and is thus reported here. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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7.  Conclusions 
Our central finding is that prices fell and churn increased in countries with a five day 
or better MNP delivery standard, as summarised in Table 9 below. 
Table 9: Estimated effect of MNP on real average retail prices and churn rates, 
for countries with a <= 5 day target maximum porting time 
MNP standard  Short run  Long run 
Average prices (real revenue per minute)  -6.58%  -12.0% 
Churn rate, quarterly average  +13.6%  +34.7% 
 
The price result can be compared to the finding in Viard (forthcoming) that there was 
a 4.4% fall in prices after the introduction of toll-free number portability, which is a 
different but similar service.
27  
We found no significant effect of MNP on churn or average prices for countries that 
applied a less stringent target for maximum porting time.  For jurisdictions requiring 
“high quality” MNP, our results are consistent with the presence of significant Type 
1 and Type 2 benefits. 
Areas for further research 
The mobile market data currently available on a consistent basis over time and across 
countries has limitations when used for modelling the effects of MNP.  First, our 
choice of a five day porting time threshold for examining MNP quality is essentially 
arbitrary, and additional data in the future should allow a finer distinction to be 
drawn between the effects of different porting time standards. 
Second, we have not been able to control for the varying price of MNP across 
countries.  In some jurisdictions, MNP is free to the subscriber.  In others, it can 
involve significant fees.  For example, the system adopted in Singapore in 1997 
                                                 
27 See Section 2.3 above. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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permitted operators to levy monthly charges on users, but from August 2003 onwards 
only a one-time administrative fee was allowed.
28  There is also variation in the 
levels of one-off fees among those jurisdictions that permit them to be charged.
29  
While charging could act as a deterrent to usage of MNP,
30 published information on 
such charges and on other aspects of MNP quality (for instance, whether or not it 
covers SMS messages) is scanty, and these dimensions are not explicitly addressed in 
our analysis. 
Future research into the effect of MNP will also benefit from the existence of 
additional time series data from jurisdictions where MNP has been implemented; 
many countries in our sample had only recently introduced these services. 
Also, publication of harmonised cross-country data by supranational bodies such as 
CEPT, which published most of the MNP implementation and porting time data we 
used in this paper (see Table 10 in the annex), should make it easier for future 
researchers to make inter-country comparisons. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Infocomm Development Authority, Singapore, 2003. 
29 Ovum (2005), Section 3.5. 
30 Buehler, Dewenter and Haucap (2006), p.395. Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability   Sean Lyons 
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 Annex: Additional information on the dataset 
 
DEN is each country’s average number of mobile telephony users (including both post-
paid and pre-paid customers) divided by the country’s population.  This variable may be 
subject to varying reporting practices in different jurisdictions.  While it is easy to define 
and measure the number of post-paid subscribers, in most jurisdictions these represent a 
minority of mobile telephony users.  The identities of the remainder, who use mobile 
telephony on a pre-paid basis, are often unknown to their network operators.  As a result, 
network operators generally use a formula to estimate the number of active customers, 
typically treating a subscriber as active if his or her phone has been used within a set 
number of months.  While we understand from Merrill Lynch (2004) that these formulae 
may vary across the sample, we have no details of the differences. 
This caveat also affects the CHURN variable, which is a quarterly average of monthly 
actual and imputed
31 disconnections from networks as a proportion of the average number 
of users in each period. 
Gross domestic product in real USD terms per capita (RGDPPC) was calculated for OECD 
countries based on local currency real GDP figures and GDP deflators from the OECD 
quarterly national accounts database.  Exchange rates were taken from IMF International 
Financial Statistics.  Figures for non-OECD countries are taken from the IMF World 
Economic Outlook database (September 2004), and are annual data, rather than quarterly.  
This treatment of GDP in non-OECD countries is not ideal, but as no quarterly national 
accounts data were available for these countries it was unavoidable.  In any event, the 
coefficients on GDP are not the focus of our analysis. 
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Table 10: Sample coverage and MNP data 













Main source for 
date of MNP 
implementation 
Argentina  10  20  -  -   
Australia  20  20  3Q01  0.0833  Regulator 
Austria  20  20  -  -  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Belgium  16  13  3Q02  2  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Brazil  20  20  -  -   
Canada  20  20  -  -  Telegeography 
Chile  20  19  -  -   
Colombia  16  12  -  -   
Denmark  8  20  3Q01  5  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Egypt  7  8  -  -   
Finland  20  20  3Q03  5  ECC/CEPT 2005 
France  20  20  3Q03  30  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Germany  20  20  4Q02  6  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Greece  20  20  3Q03  1  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Hong Kong  20    1Q99  2  Regulator 
Hungary  12  19  2Q04  14  ECC/CEPT 2005 
India  20  20  -  -  Telegeography 
Ireland  11  11  3Q03  0.0833  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Israel  20  18  -  -   
Italy  20  20  2Q02  5  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Japan  20  20  -  -   
Malaysia  20  20  -  -   
Mexico  20  20  -  -   
Netherlands  20  20  2Q99  10  ECC/CEPT 2005 
New Zealand  20  20  -  -   
Norway  14  20  4Q01  7  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Poland  20  9  -  -  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Portugal  20  20  1Q02  20  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Russia  17  17  -  -   
South Africa  20  20  -  -   
Spain  15  20  4Q00  4  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Sweden  20  20  3Q01  5  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Switzerland  20    1Q00  5  ECC/CEPT 2005 
Taiwan  12  15  -  -   
Thailand  20  4  -  -   
Turkey  13  8  -  -   
UK  20  20  1Q99  9  ECC/CEPT 2005 
US  16  17  4Q03  0.104  Regulator 
Venezuela    19  -  -   
 
                                                                                                                                                    
31 Pre-paid users inactive for a specified period. 